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1997-98 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture 
Religious Freedom as if 
Religion Matters: A Tribute to 
Justice Brennan 
Stephen L. Cartert 
My subject is the worship and following of God, which is, for tens of 
millions of Americans, the single most important activity of their lives. 
This crucial human activity, which has been with us in one form or another 
all through history, is treated in constitutional law under the heading of 
religious freedom. I shall argue that the choice to treat worship and fol-
lowing as rights is actually in severe tension with the idea of religion itself, 
and that a constitutional right to religious freedom, if understood in the 
usual language of rights, holds the potential for great harm to the religions. 
My lecture is dedicated to the late Justice William Brennan, because when 
Justice Brennan retired in 1990, the Supreme Court lost one of its two 
members (the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, who retired a year later, was 
the other) who seemed to have the richest understanding of this conflict, 
and of the likely need for the nation to accept a degree of postmodern am-
biguity in responding to it. 
I am not today concerned with the correct result in concrete cases as 
much as I am with theory and trend. Indeed, I am unpersuaded that consti-
tutional law can resolve the dilemma I plan to present. The Supreme 
Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 1 striking down as uncon-
stitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), illustrates 
as plainly as one could ask the difficulty the state faces in trying to 
Copyright © 1999 Stephen L. Carter. 
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. An earlier version of this 
article served as the basis of the Brennan Lecture, delivered at the School of Law, University of 
California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) in November 1997 and at Georgetown University Law Center in 
April1998. Some of the themes of the paper were also discussed in my presentation as part of a panel 
sponsored by the Law and Religion Section of the Association of American Law Schools in January 
1997. I have benefited greatly from the many thoughtful comments and criticisms offered on those 
occasions, as well as at a faculty workshop at Yale Law School in November 1998. 
I. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). One of the most thoughtful analyses of the decision, albeit by the 
lawyer who lost the case, is Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 743 (1998). 
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conceptualize the worship and following of God as constitutional rights 
rather than vital human activities. RFRA, it must be admitted, was no 
masterpiece of statutory drafting-but at least its advocates (I among them) 
sensed the outlines of the problem, even if we thought, mistakenly I now 
believe, that positive law could provide the solution. 
I have lately come to the view that the challenge facing religions un-
der the American constitutional regime is deeper, and more perplexing, 
than those of us who supported RFRA thought. The problem is not, as the 
statute supposed, that the courts have been applying the wrong standard in 
religious freedom cases. The problem is that religion itself, particularly 
deeply committed religious faith, with all the discipline that the term im-
plies, is simply not a force that law can afford to unleash. 
The legal instinct is the instinct to control human behavior, and every 
effort to define the ·contours of religious freedom as a matter of law is 
really an effort to limit what human beings can do when they worship and 
follow God. The religions by their nature resist the demands of law. In 
their traditional forms, all the Western religions teach that the obligation to 
follow the law as promulgated by God is superior to the obligation to fol-
low a contradictory law as promulgated by human beings. Indeed, the idea 
that God's will is both different from and higher than the will of fellow 
humans, even humans with the power to create binding law, is one of the 
signal contributions of Judaism to civilization. In the Jewish tradition, the 
idea of this difference is illustrated by the prophets calling Israel to account 
for failing to adhere to the will of God. Christianity, founded as a prophetic 
religion, squandered much of this wisdom during its thousand-year effort 
to meld the spiritual and temporal powers into one. 
Postmodern theologians see religion as subversive to the culture it 
inhabits. As long as religion avoids the temptation to join its authority to 
the authority of the state, it can indeed play a subversive role, because it 
focuses the attention of the believer on a source of moral understanding 
that transcends both the authority of positive law and the authority of hu-
man moral systems. Quite simply, religion in its subversive mode provides 
the believer with a transcendent reason to question the power of the state. 
That is the reason that the state will always try to domesticate religion: to 
avoid being subverted. 
This is no new insight, and it is not meant as a judgment. Any state 
will try to control the forces that might upend it, for a state, as though 
organic, will do whatever it must to survive. Religion is a potential threat 
to that survival. The domestication of religion is the process through which 
the state tries to move religion from a position in which it threatens the 
state to a position in which it supports the state. One way to do this is by 
designating a particular religion as the official one-that is, to establish a 
church. An established church makes a very bad trade, exchanging its faith 
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that God will preserve it for a trust in the state to preserve it. Worse, an 
established church loses its incentive to subvert the state, for if an estab-
lished church subverts the state, it is subverting the source of its power. 
American constitutional law (as interpreted from the middle of the 
twentieth century onward) does not allow the establishment of an official 
religion.2 Yet, perhaps paradoxically, constitutional law is also one of the 
tools through which our nation tries to domesticate religion. How? By 
pressuring the religions, as the price of state protection, to shape them-
selves into a mold that the state itself prescribes. If you fmd this claim un-
persuasive, I ask only that you withhold judgment, for I will shortly review 
it in more detail. For the moment, let us pursue a different 
point: Domestication, in the long run, almost always fails. It is religion's 
familiar habit to burst constantly the bonds placed upon it by human law.3 
When the subject is religion, law cannot deliver what it promises. 
In discussing the unfortunate constitutional status of worshipping and 
following God-what is known in the Christian tradition as discipleship-! 
will talk a bit about theology, a bit about sociology, a bit about history, a 
bit about education, and even a bit about law. I will close the discussion by 
taking as my text an opinion written by Justice Brennan, concurring in a 
Supreme Court decision now more than a decade old. But first, in order to 
set the stage, I want to talk a bit about the Calendar of Saints. 
ST. CHRISTINA, DuALITY, AND LAw's DILEMMA 
There is a wonderful old story about the search for the true history, if 
you will, of a fourth-century saint named Christina. I am not referring to 
the famous Saint Christina of Markyate, who lived eight hundred years 
later, but an earlier one, for whom a tiny handful of European churches are 
named. It turned out that there were two women who might have been the 
model for Saint Christina. Let us call them Christina One and Christina 
Two. Some legends favored Christina One; some legends favored Christina 
Two. After years of research, historians discovered that they had a prob-
lem: Christina One had indeed led a saintly life but could not have been 
2. Until the middle years of the twentieth century, the question of the application of the 
Establishment Clause to the states was unanswered, a fact of constitutional history that we occasionally 
neglect when, in discussing the First Amendment, we wax poetic about the wisdom of the founders. 
The flfSt case to apply the Establishment Clause to the states was Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). Many scholars have suggested that the incorporation of the Clause is harder than the 
courts tend to assume, particularly given its plain and well-understood reference to Congress. See, e.g., 
Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1157 (1991). 
3. Domestication begins with a claim of protection. Thus I am not speaking here of the willed 
effort to destroy a religion through state violence, an effort which has, in recent human history, often 
succeeded (as in what the historian Jon Butler has called the "African spiritual holocaust" during 
slavery, see JoN BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH (1990)) but has also often failed (as when Hitler 
succeeded in murdering millions of Jews but not in destroying Judaism). I have in mind, rather, forms 
of domestication that are believed by the state to benefit the religions. 
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the model for Saint Christina because she was not, in fact, named 
Christina. Christina Two was named Christina and also lived a saintly life 
but could not have been the model for Saint Christina because she never 
existed. In other words, there evidently was no fourth-century Saint 
Christina.4 
I often think of this story when I ponder the difficulties in interpreting 
the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. One reason I think 
of it is that it matches so well the problem with the competing theories on 
how the courts should interpret the religion clause (which common but er-
roneous usage translates into the religion "clauses"). There are, nowadays, 
two principal schools of thought. One strand, which survives in popular 
discourse and in the courts but is in serious danger of vanishing from the 
academy, is the view that the state must be neutral, neither choosing among 
religions nor choosing between religion and non-religion. Unsurprisingly, 
this is known in the literature as neutrality. The second strand, thriving in 
academic discourse but remarkably difficult to express in popular dis-
course, is that the state must take steps to accommodate religious believers 
whose practices are burdened by otherwise neutral state laws. This strand, 
predictably, is known as accommodationism. 
I confess that I have somewhat oversimplified a vast and often intri-
cate literature. There are any number of carefully nuanced middle posi-
tions. Yet, in the end, nearly all theorists lean toward one of these two 
positions, simply because legal theory (unlike, say, literary theory) must 
fmally guide the decisions by actual judges of actual cases. Consequently, 
legal theorists quite understandably feel impelled to tell us in the end how 
the cases should come out. And, in the end, just about everybody who pre-
sents a theory-no matter what the theory is called-winds up favoring 
something that looks an awful lot like either neutrality or accommoda-
tionism. 
Very well, what has all this to do with the search for Saint Christina? 
Just this: I think that neutrality is a theory about freedom of religion in a 
world that does -not and cannot exist, whereas accommodationism, al-
though a theory about the real world, is not really a theory about freedom 
of religion. But, unlike the typical academic critic, I am not going to call 
for some new and better theory. On the contrary, I shall argue that although 
a theory of religious freedom is plainly necessary to the proper function of 
the state (because its courts must decide actual cases), a theory of religious 
freedom may be unnecessary to, and might even prove dangerous to, re-
ligion itself. 
Now, then: why do I say that neutrality is a theory about a world that 
does not and cannot exist? Because neutrality supposes that it is possible 
for the state to act without taking any account of religion generally, or of 
4. See the discussion in David Hugh Fanner, The Oxford Dictionary of Saints 99 (4th ed. 1997). 
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the specific religious beliefs of constituent groups. No religion is to be fa-
vored over any other; nor is reiigion generally to be favored over 
non-religion. The metaphorical wall of separation of church and state 
(which is only a metaphor, although we sometimes pretend it is a part of 
our constitutional law) seeks to capture this idea: there is the sphere of 
religion and the sphere of the state, and a mighty wall protecting each from 
the other. 
But none of this is possible. 
In the first place, what we are bold to call neutrality means in practice 
that big religions win and small religions lose. When the Supreme Court 
decreed in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n5 that three 
Indian tribes in California could not prevent the Forest Service from al-
lowing roadbuilding and logging on their sacred lands, the Justices, I sup-
pose, believed that they were acting neutrally: The trib~s had no more 
right than anybody else to protect the lands. But from the point of view of 
the tribes, whose religious tradition, as the Justices admitted, would be 
"devastated" by the government's action, there was nothing neutral about 
the destruction of the forest. 6 With the forest gone, their religion also 
would be gone: a neutral result without any remotely neutral conse-
quences.7 
A more powerful religion would not suffer so from neutrality. To take 
what might seem a painfully obvious example, nobody proposes to build a 
road through the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in Manhattan. My own 
Episcopal Church, although its numbers are dwindling, remains suffi-
ciently powerful that nobody would even dream of so absurd a notion. 
(And, lest you object that the federal government "owns" the national for-
ests, but not the cathedral, let me add that nobody would dare try to take 
the cathedral through eminent domain either.) To be sure, neutrality gov-
erns this result: The cathedral is not safe because it is a religious build-
ing-it is safe because it is a building valued by a politically powerful 
constituent group. But that only illustrates the point. Neutrality is a blue-
print for the accidental destruction of religions that lack power. 
The reason neutrality fails is that it imagines an impossible world. No 
true wall of separation is possible. Religion and the state, the two great 
sources of control all through human history, will never be fully separate 
from each other. Each will always shade into the other's sphere. School-
children learn this truth in their science classes: All containers leak. The 
only interesting question is how fast. In the case of religion and the state, 
5. 485 u.s. 439 (1988). 
6. ld. at 451. 
7. As Professor Choper points out in his comment on this lecture, the roads have, as of this 
writing, not yet been built See Jesse Choper, Comments on Stephen Carter's Lecture, 87 CALIF. L. 
REv. 1087, 1089 (1999). The Supreme Court, however, deserves none of the credit for the maintenance 
of the status quo. 
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the leakage is rapid, and constant. How could matters be otherwise? Re-
ligion, by focusing the attention of the believer on the idea of transcendent 
truth, necessarily changes the person the believer is, which in tum changes 
the way the believer interacts with the world; which in tum changes politi-
cal outcomes. Although there have been some clever moves in political 
philosophy to explain why the religious voice should not be a part of our 
public debates, such theories wind up describing debates from which 
deeply religious people are simply absent. 8 
Besides, in a nation in which the great majority of voters describe 
themselves as religious, religious belief will usually be the background-
ev~n if frequently unstated-of our policy debates. A widespread religious 
conviction that we must aid the poor will inevitably find its way into leg-
islation, and so the nation will create welfare programs. A widespread re-
ligious conviction that long-term help is no substitute for hard work will 
inevitably find its way into legislation, and so welfare will evolve into 
workfare. 
Once one recognizes that the wall of separation leaks, and leaks 
badly, the case for neutrality disappears. It seeks to impose an artificial 
order on a naturally chaotic relationship. By so doing, it cloaks hard truths 
about our society. Some of the truths are pleasant-for example, the happy 
truth that religion matters deeply to most people, even in politics. And 
some of the truths are unpleasant-for example, the tragic fact that other 
people's religions often matter less to people than their own. (One recalls 
Ambrose Bierce's definition of a Christian: "One who believes that the 
New Testament is a splendid guide for the life of his neighbor.") This 
truth, too, works its way into policy, which is why the "neutral" result in 
Lyng is able to stand. No constitutional problem arises, evidently, if the 
state acts in a way that "devastates" (the Court's word) a religion, as long 
as the state does so by accident. 
The bureaucrats who decided to build the road and level the sacred 
forest were not wicked people, but fallible humans, engaged in the fallible 
human task of governance. Yet none of them, I suspect, would have con-
sidered for a moment allowing the destruction of whatever physical symbol 
their own religions held to be sacred. Neutrality's ideal world, in which all 
of us rigorously separate our religious and secular selves, simply is not the 
world in which most Americans live.9 And so, although neutrality is 
certainly a theory about religion and law, it is not a theory about a world 
that exists. 
8. Rather than bore the reader with a lengthy footnote, let me simply state that I discuss some of 
this important literature, and what I see as its shortcomings, in my 1993 book The Culture of 
Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, especially chapters 2 and 11. 
9. The theologian Stanley Hauerwas has argued that this separation has a deeper flaw, that the 
very concept of the "secular" is imaginary and, to the Christian, incomprehensible. See STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT: THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SECULAR (1995), 
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But that is the easy half of the argument. Neutrality theory has had 
its critics for thirty years, and many of them have now become 
accommodationists; that is, they believe that the right approach is for the 
state to make itself quite intentionally aware of the religions of its constitu-
ents, and then, if necessary and possible, to adjust its legal requirements, 
offering special exemptions so that its constituents are able to exercise 
their religions freely. To the accommodationist, a decision like Goldman v. 
Weinberger10 is risible, although the neutralist defends it-Goldman being 
the case in which the Supreme Court allowed the Air Force to discipline 
Major Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, for wearing a yarmulke while 
in uniform, a violation of military regulations. If you think the punishment 
was right, on the ground that the same rules should apply to everybody, 
you are a neutralist; if you think the case was wrong, that a special excep-
tion to uniform regulations should exist for religious apparel, you are an 
accommodationist. (And if you think the whole idea of military uniform 
regulations is risible, you are, without question, interestingly quixotic, but, 
when it comes to the resolution of concrete cases, not actually helpful.) 
Ever since I began writing about religious freedom something over a 
decade ago, I have counted myself as an accommodationist.U I suppose 
that I still am-yet I have started to wonder. So let me here make a public 
confession. I have come to think that there is a deep problem with accom-
modation as a response to the state's denial of religious freedom. The 
problem is not really a problem about accommodation; the problem is a 
problem about constitutional rights. The problem is one I find sufficiently 
severe that it threatens (in my mind at least) the entire project of protecting 
religion through the Constitution. It bears a strong resemblance to a similar 
problem in public theology, identified long ago by S~ren Kierkegaard. But 
rather than describe the problem directly now, I prefer, for the sake of 
clarity, to come to it by what might seem to be the longer route. 
ACCOMMODATIONS, STATISM, AND BRENNAN'S INSIGHT 
The problem I have in mind is a subset of a larger problem: our 
evidently hopeless passion for statism. When I say statism, I do not simply 
mean, as the formal definition would suggest, a preference for state solu-
tions; I have in mind a sense of the state's rightness, or goodness-an 
empirical belief that the state is less likely than the individual to make a 
moral error. Since the Enlightenment, the entire liberal political project has 
rested on this idea. The rightness of the state (whether in the sense of social 
contract, as in Hobbes and Rousseau, or in the sense of reasoning about 
obligation, as in Kant) is the source of the state's authority to use force to 
10. 475 u.s. 503 (1986). 
11. I suppose my most optimistic statement of the accommodationist faith appears in my article 
The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARv. L. REv. 118 (1993). 
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coerce individuals. That we elect our government by majority vote and call 
our system democracy does nothing to change the statist truth that the 
democratic majority, when certain that it is right, can coerce the dissenting 
individual. 
But, wait, you say-that is why we have constitutional rights. They 
are designed to avoid precisely the problem of statism. They carve out a 
sphere, we like to say, within which the individual is sovereign, and thus is 
not subject to state coercion. Free speech, for example: here, we might 
say, no state, no matter how great its democratic majority, may interfere. 
And the same for equal protection and for due process, and, of course, for 
religion. All of these rights are set out in the constitutional text. And so 
statism is turned back-isn't it? 
Would that it were so! There is, unfortunately, a catch. The catch is 
that the engine of protection for constitutional rights is the judicial branch. 
That is, if I believe that the state is interfering with my sovereign sphere, I 
go to court and try to persuade a judge that I am right. If I lose, I make the 
same argument to some more judges. If I lose again, but am nevertheless 
very lucky, I make the argument a final time to a set of nine judges-
Justices-who have the final word. They tell us, authoritatively, what the 
Constitution means, which means they also tell me, authoritatively, what I 
may and may not do. If they say I have the right I claim, I have it. If they 
say the state may coerce me, the state may coerce me. 
Why is this a problem? It is a problem, as the Critical Legal Studies 
scholars used to point out, and the Legal Realists before them, because the 
judges are themselves a part of the state. They are not (despite what we tell 
our students) a check on the state-they are a part of the state. We think of 
rights, nowadays, as proceeding from the state. That is the precise mean-
ing, today, of the phrase "constitutional right'': a right that is protected in 
the foundational document of the state, and that the state is obliged, be-
cause of that textual protection, to respect. 
But this is just a long way of saying that the state grants the right. We 
have grown accustomed to this rhetoric in America-the idea that rights 
are protected by judges-but the ubiquity of the idea should not blind us to 
the fact that to file a lawsuit before a judge is the analytical equivalent of 
asking state permission to exercise a constitutional right. 
Perhaps this does not matter for most claims of right; but in any case, 
they are not my subject. 12 I do think this matters, deeply, when we consider 
religion. If we take religion seriously, as a force in the human spirit and as 
a connection to the transcendent, we can see at once why it matters. The 
I2. As it happens, I do believe that an obligation to God is not like an obligation to a strongly 
held secular moral view, but my analysis does not turn on this belief, and, in any case, I doubt that I 
possess the rhetorical tools to persuade those who disagree. But only in the mirror maze of secular 
discourse is the weakness of my rhetorical abilities evidence that I am wrong. 
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three great Western religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, all propose 
the existence of a Creator-God whose will is superior to any human 
construct, including human law. The demands this Creator-God places on 
humans-who are among the created, or creatures-are absolute. The 
Bible and the other narrative traditions of these faiths are full of stories of 
God's people practicing God's rules in the face of human disapproval, 
even human punishment. How, then, can God's people go to the state and 
seek permission to do what God requires? 
For, again, this is what happens when a constitutional right is asserted. 
In the case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 13 
the city adopted an animal-rights ordinance with the sole apparent purpose 
of ridding itself of the practitioners of Santeria. The Santerfa faith teaches 
that each of us is assisted by a personal God, an orisha, which must be 
nourished, lest it die and our fate be sealed. In their religious ceremonies, 
the santeros sometimes sacrifice live animals to the orishas. In their cos-
mology, they have no choice: They cannot allow the orishas to die, and 
the blood of ceremonially killed animals is crucial to the survival of the 
orishas. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance on what amounted 
to a discrimination argument; it was not enforced against anybody but the 
church. 
Now, suppose instead the case of a neutral animal rights ordinance, 
not one aimed only at shutting down Santeria. The neutralist would enforce 
it. Many (not all) accommodationists would allow an exemption. But in 
either case, the santeros have no choice about what to do. If they truly be-
lieve the teachings of the faith, they must make the sacrifices, whether the 
state allows it or not. In other words, if the state refuses permission, that 
does not change their obligation to follow what they take to be the will of 
God. 14 
Of course, the obligation to God does not always survive the threat of 
state punishment. The willingness of the state to punish behavior B effec-
tively pressures religionists who believe God requires B to change their 
faith. As the late Robert Cover pointed out in his classic article Nomos and 
Narrative, religions often discover their own true and best selves in the 
dialectic with the awful reality of the coercive power of their fellow 
13. 508 u.s. 520 (1993). 
14. The problem of the animal rights ordinance helps explain why the distinction between fact 
and belief that is so crucial to much of Western thought is often incomprehensible within the confines 
of a particular religion. To the santeros, the notion that their futures will be destroyed should the 
orishas die is a fact, not a belief. Thus, the santeros can provide what we might think of as a secular 
reason for their sacrifices: They want to live healthy, productive lives. True, nobody who lacks their 
faith in the orishas will accept this "secular" truth, any more than someone who lacks faith in the 
medicinal qualities of marijuana will be impressed by "secular'' claims that its use should be 
normalized; but this is precisely what makes the notion of the secular so slippery. 
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citizens acting as the state. 15 So the Mormons, harassed and brutalized by 
state power, yielded their insistence on polygamy (more accurately, poly-
gyny). This demonstrates the awesome force the state can wield, but it also 
may suggest that polygamy was not truly at the heart of the Mormon re-
ligion. 
Such discoveries are useful for a religion that prefers its doctrine pure. 
This does not mean that oppression is good. Even if one believes that even 
the worst evil, iu some mysterious way, serves God's plan, that answer is 
not quite adequate to the present point. Rather, I would say that although 
oppression of the religious (like oppression of other forms) is evil, when it 
does occur, it helps us to learn who we truly are. 
In the end, the what-we-truly-are that religion R discovers of itself 
might involve behavior B, no matter how the state tries to discourage it. 
Sometimes, heroically, adherents of R will do B even when doing so 
means arrest, and worse. (The Jewish and Christian Bibles are thick with 
examples.) Sometimes adherents of R will do B even when most of us are 
quite convinced that B is actively wicked. Indeed, I will admit to a sneak-
ing admiration for the Christian racists of Bob Jones University-the sub-
ject that sparked Cover's article. 
In the early years of the Reagan Administration, the federal govern-
ment joined forces with Bob Jones University to challenge the power of the 
Internal Revenue Service to deny tax exempt status to schools that dis-
criminate on the basis of race. The university, citing principally the Tower 
of Babel story, did not allow interracial dating (it allowed very little dating 
of any kind) and did not admit as students people married to people of 
other races. 16 Bob Jones University lost its appeal before the Supreme 
Court, 17 at which point just about everybody expected the school to aban~ 
don its discriminatory policies rather than lose its tax exemption. But just 
about everybody was wrong. The school decided to stick with its version 
of Christianity and give up its tax exemption.18 
There are happier examples-civil rights activists and abolitionists 
going to prison rather than recanting what their God has taught them-but 
we must not be ahistorical. The state imprisoned them not because a few 
nasty racists had their hands on the levers of power but because the side the 
15. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Tenn-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARv. L. REv. 4, 51-53 (1983). 
16. The Reagan Administration took the view that the case was about the separation of powers, 
not the right to discriminate, and that the authority to deny the exemption rested in Congress, not the 
IRS. Tills claim of high principle would have been more persuasive had the Administration announced 
its decision to seek an amendment barring discrimination on the basis of race by tax-exempt entities 
before, rather than after, announcing its decision to join the Bob Jones lawsuit. See Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 n.9 (1983). 
17. See id. at 574. 
18. For a profile of the university a decade after the Supreme Court decision, see Kate Muir, 
Majoring in Bible-bashing, TIMEs (London), Nov. 21, 1992, (Saturday Review), at 21. 
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protesters took was, at the time they took it, not a popular one. Their 
mythic character depends on our belief today that the protesters had it 
right, but the heroic character of their resistance does not depend on 
whether we agree with them or not. Antiwar protesters, not popular in the 
early Vietnam days and pretty much ignored if the war happens to involve 
Saddam Hussein, are also resisters to state power; so are protesters who 
fight abortion. It is our habit to sort the resisters depending on what we 
think of the side they take on controversial issues, and this is a very human, 
as well as quite sensible, response. As Oscar Wilde noted, the fact that a 
man dies for a cause does not mean the cause is right. But even when the 
cause is wrong, we should not overlook the heroism of those willing to be 
punished for their belief in its rightness. 
To be sure, not all religionists will be heroic in the face of official 
pressure, and not all religions demand martyrdom of their followers. Ad-
herents of R, faced with the threat of state punishment if they do B, some-
times will not abandon their belief that God requires them to do B, but will 
decide nevertheless not to do it. This is not a sign that they do not "really" 
believe they are required to do B. It is a sign only of human frailty. 
Those religions that will back off when threatened with pressure pose 
little threat to the state that tries to create a dominant meaning, for the 
hegemonic state naturally counts on human frailty as an ally. Those relig-
ions that refuse to back off are more threatening. Sometimes, the inability 
of the state to rout the resisting religion leads to deep and fundamental al-
terations in the state itself, as when the Roman Empire was transformed by 
Christianity (not that either Christianity or the Empire benefited much). So 
the state will work harder to achieve its goal. 
What goal? The simplest way to put it is standardization-in particu-
lar, standardization of the people. For the modem Western democracies, 
whatever their pretensions to diversity, often seem to desire most a nation 
in which all citizens are essentially the same.19 This tendency is a charac-
teristic of nationhood, not of democracy as such. Totalitarian or religious 
states do it, too, and far more ruthlessly than democracies do. But democ-
racies still do it.20 The literature is full of assertions that it is a commonality 
of values and outlook, in short a shared sense of meaning, that makes a 
people a people and, thus, a nation a nation. 
The temptation, however, is one that the just state will resist. Indeed, 
the strongest argument in favor of the accommodation of religion is the 
preservation of genuine diversity-not simply people who look different, 
19. The most open and obvious version in the West was the transformation of France, as set forth 
in Eugen Weber's wonderful yet tragic book, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF 
RURAL FRANcE, 1870-1914 (1976). As I shall argue, however, we Americans may only be less clumsy, 
not more just See infra text accompanying notes 39-58. 
20. See Charles Taylor, Storrs Lecture at Yale Law School (Nov. 1998). 
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but people who in deep ways are different. The accommodationist believes 
in religion as something that actually changes the way that people are; 
nurturing religion, then, also nurtures a plurality of nomic communities.21 
The accommodationist, therefore, argues that the state should back off 
whenever it can-formally, whenever a compelling state interest is not 
served by the effort to rein in religions that would otherwise press for 
meanings of reality that the state abhors. 22 
These are already dangerous words, because they can invite oppres-
sion: The state, after all, might reasonably conclude that many different 
ends are compelling. Indeed, the immediate difficulty for the accommoda-
tionist is that it is the state that is doing the accommodating. The problem 
facing the religionist is deeper than the struggle between the ideal of neu-
trality and the reality of accommodation. For the accommodationist, at the 
very beginning of the analysis, is faced with two crucial problems that nec-
essarily limit religious freedom. First, the accommodationist must define 
religion, which already narrows the universe of what counts. One saw evi-
dence of this, for example, in the Third Circuit's rather shaky attempt some 
years ago to show that MOVE is not a religion, and thus that adherents of 
MOVE who are incarcerated are entitled to none of the special considera-
tion that prison authorities must grant to inmates of faiths that the courts 
recognize. 23 The same problem occurred when a Massachusetts appellate 
court decreed in Needham Pastoral Counseling Center, Inc. v. Board of 
Appeals24 that when religious counseling is informed even in part by secu-
lar psychology, it ceases to be religious and is entitled to no free exercise 
protection. The problem is plain: If the religion seeking an accommoda-
tion must first prove to the state (through its courts) that it is a religion, it is 
already under pressure to meet a test that might have nothing to do with the 
religion's teaching. 
21. Both the terminology and the argumentation are borrowed from Cover, supra note 15. For a 
suggestion that the authors of the First Amendment believed in allowing communities of believers to 
struggle together toward a truer understanding of God, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 
(1986). 
22. One of the simplest judicial statements of the compelling interest test for accommodation is 
that of Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) in her concurring and dissenting 
opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986): "[T]he government must accommodate a 
legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by narrowly tailored 
means." Bowen involved the religious objection by Native American parents to using a Social Security 
number to identify their daughter, Little Bird of Snow. The plurality opinion answered that victory for 
the claimants would require the government to "join in their chosen religious practices." /d. at 700. The 
theorist of resistance will immediately spot the weakness of the plurality's position: The state 
interferes quite actively with the nurturing of the religious community when it requires parents to 
conceptualize their children, even for a brief time, as the impersonal objects of bureaucratic scrutiny. 
On the other hand, as will become clear, I do not think the dissent got matters precisely right either. 
23. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1036 (3d Cir. 1981). 
24. 557 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. App. Ct 1990). 
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The courts might try to avoid this difficulty, by adopting, for example, 
Kent Greenawalt's proposal (following a suggesting of Arlin Adams, the 
judge in the MOVE case) that we define religion analogically.25 
Greenawalt suggests that we begin with what we know to be religions, 
search out their common elements, and then compare other claimants by 
looking for similar (but perhaps not identical) elements. This approach 
(which is, I think, more impressionistic than analogical) would have the 
advantage of not forcing all religions into a single, narrow mold, a point to 
which I shall return. But it would have the disadvantage of beginning with 
the religions with which our culture is most familiar, which at once makes 
potential outsiders of religions that may look very different. Besides, like 
all definitional approaches, this one still says to people of faith that they 
must ensure that they come within the approved definition if they want, in 
a legal sense, to be free. 
Second, the accommodationist must indicate a limit beyond which no 
claim of religious freedom will be recognized-to resolve, for example, the 
problem of religiously mandated murder. Most accommodationists, along 
with the now-unconstitutional RFRA, place the limit at "compelling state 
interest;" but even setting compellingness as the standard, and handling it 
correctly, the courts in the end will be centering their concern on the needs 
of the state, not the needs of the religionist. This became painfully clear in 
1996, when the Supreme Court refused to review the Alaska Supreme 
Court's decision in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,26 
which held that the state's interest in preventing discrimination against 
unmarried heterosexual couples is sufficiently great to trump the objections 
of landlords who believe they are forbidden by God to permit "fornication" 
on their property. It is not easy to discern what made the interest compel-
ling, except that the state had decreed it to be so. 
The simple problem is that the accommodationist must ultimately 
draw some lines; and every line divides those religions that will be privi-
leged from those that will be demoted. The mere existence of these divid-
ing lines creates pressures on religions to twist themselves into shapes that 
the state (through its courts) will recognize. Perhaps were we mortals sin-
less, the problem would not arise, for we would readily resist state pressure 
to be different. But that asks too much of weak flesh. We search for ways 
to ease our path through life; that is our nature. No religion picks a fight 
with the state if it can be avoided, and few religionists are able to resist the 
lure of state assistance. And so, precisely because the rules of constitu-
tional law create some faint possibility of gaining special consideration, the 
question the religion must ask itself becomes (to take Needham as our 
25. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 
(1984). 
26. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994). 
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example) not What form of counseling does God require?, but What form 
of counseling will the state allow? Thus does constitutional protection of 
religion threaten to undo the specialness of religion itself. 
The trouble all arises because our theories of religious freedom are 
not theories about religion; they are theories about the state and its needs. 
If the religious freedom claimant loses, it is because the state's interest is 
too strong-not because religion's interest is too weak. Although the tests 
are referred to as balances, they are not, for they suffer from the well-
understood deficiency of such inquiries: The tests fail to tell us the 
weights to be given to the different variables. Indeed, the tests do not even 
tell us what all the variables are. In Swanner, what in the world was a fair-
minded court to weigh-and against what else-in deciding whether the 
state's interest in protecting unmarried couples from discrimination is suf-
ficiently compelling to trump the religionist's interest in following God's 
ban on allowing fornication? The test does not say, and probably cannot 
say, and so the judges, tossed upon the stormy seas of their own resources, 
seek the safest harbor they know: They are creatures of the state, and so is 
the Constitution, and so what comes to matter most is quite naturally the 
interest of the state. And that is where the problem centers: for the religion 
that makes a legal claim for religious freedom is petitioning a functionary 
of the state for permission to worship and follow God. But what sort of 
religion can (or should) comfortably do such a thing? 
Suppose the state says, "No." Is the follower of R then to decide that 
B is not required after all-because the state will punish him if he does it? 
In principle, this outcome is no more appealing than the notion that the 
state should decide to allow the follower of R to do B because he is going 
to do it anyway, even if punishment follows. But no such symmetry exists. 
We seem to expect that the sensible religionist will take into account state 
response in making a decision whether to break the law or not; yet we evi-
dently suppose it to be absurd that the sensible state should take into ac-
count religious response in deciding whether to enforce the law or not. The 
religionist who persists in doing B after it is deemed to carry no constitu-
tional protection is a fanatic, but the state that puts him in jail is only doing 
its job. This result is possible because-and only because-the state, not 
the religionist, has the guns. 
In a nation that properly prides itself on religious pluralism, we 
certainly do not want to put the guns in the hands of the competing relig-
ions instead. Yet the same pride should help us to recognize that the 
asymmetry of religious freedom is mischievous. Although the compel-
lingness test (which only accommodationists believe in anyway) gives us a 
standard for determining which state interests are so vital that a claim of 
religious requirement cannot overcome them, we have no test for deter-
mining which religious interests are so vital that no state interest-not even 
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a compelling one-can overcome them. In other words, the balance is 
struck in a way that creates only two sets of cases: those that are hard and 
those in which the state automatically wins. There may be no set of cases 
in which the religion automatically wins. 27 
The asymmetry is also unstable. The neat separation assumed by the 
model does not survive. The result is not chaos; the result, rather, is a 
steady leakage in our separation cylinder, but leakage in only one direc-
tion, so that the state wins more and more and the religionist wins less and 
less, precisely the trend line of the cases over the past twenty years. This 
does not mean that there is a point at which accommodation and neutrality 
converge (although there may be); it means only that as time and cases go 
by, the state-centeredness of what we are bold to call religious freedom is 
more and more apparent, and the pressure on religionists to conform to the 
expectations of others grows and grows, with the inevitable complicity of 
the judges who supposedly protect religion's "right" to be free. 
RELIGION, COMMUNITY, AND RESISTANCE 
But that, you might say, is simply the way the world works. For me to 
accuse the courts of being state-centered on religion issues, you might ar-
gue, smacks of sophistry. After all, the judges must decide the cases prop-
erly before them.28 To decide cases they must draw lines. That the lines 
judges draw are occasionally a little bit arbitrary is a very old critique of 
judging. Unless we are to adopt a standard under which the religious free-
dom claimant always wins, then we must pick a point, by some method, at 
27. The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta, and at least one federal court of appeals has held 
as a matter of law, that the selection of clergy should be utterly beyond the scrutiny of the state. In 
Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church inN. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 
(1952), the Supreme Court proposed that "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations" requires that 
churches retain the "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." The Justices added: "Freedom to select the clergy, 
where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal 
constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." !d. at 116. 
In Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 112 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 418 U.S. 1020 (1986), the Fourth Circuit applied the Kedroff language to hold that the 
provisions of Title vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banning discrimination on the basis of sex 
cannot be applied to selection of clergy. 
I obviously agree with the language and spirit of Kedroff, as well as with the result in Rayburn. 
But this approach has its critics. For example, Professor Jane Rutherford, in a provocative recent 
article, neatly turns contemporary legal scholarship on its head, pointing out that if the contemporary 
critics are right that the courts have erred by conceptualizing religion as a choice rather than an 
obligation, we have an additional reason to consider the application of Title Vll to religious 
groups: those who are dissatisfied with a religion's hiring policies do not, as the courts seem to think, 
retain the option of easy exit. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The 
Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 1049 (1996). 
28. Few scholars, and virtually no judges, seem to believe any longer in the passive virtues 
introduced into constitutional discourse by Alexander Bickel. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME CoURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
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which the claimant loses. Whatever that point turns out to be, it will in-
variably be the point at which the losing claimant will accuse the judges of 
statism. 
And besides (so the counterargument might continue), trade-offs are a 
necessary part of life in society. Of course religions will sometimes feel 
themselves pressured to change, because everybody is pressured to 
conform; that is a fact of life, not of law. If a religious belief is sufficiently 
strong, it will survive the pressure. I have already mentioned that Bob 
Jones University refused to yield to state pressure to abandon its religious 
belief in racial separation after losing in the Supreme Court in 1983. But 
even had the school chosen to back off, we might have concluded that so-
cietal pressure against segregation is so strong that the belief might have 
collapsed anyway, that it was social change, not state action, that led to the 
abandonment of Christian racism. Imagine, on the other hand, that the 
Internal Revenue Service had been after Bob Jones to abandon faith in Je-
sus Christ as Son of God and Savior, the bedrock on which Christianity 
rests. In that case, nobody would have been surprised by the school's re-
fusal to back down. 
Neither one of these objections disturbs the theory. Yes, judges must 
decide cases and draw lines; but it is the fact that judges must draw lines-
not the place where the lines happen to be drawn-that creates the risk for 
religions that go to court to seek protection. And, yes, religionists should 
ideally be strong enough to resist state pressure; but the state itself has 
created layer on layer of purportedly neutral pressures that combine to 
weaken the ability of the religions (or, rather, the religious people) to re-
sist. Among these layers are a variety of tax benefits, which encourage re-
ligions to shape themselves so as to be eligible, and the recent move, 
certainly constitutional but of dubious value to religion, to allow religious 
groups to share in the rather substantial largesse of the programmatic side 
of the welfare state. 29 
I noted earlier that some postmodern theologians describe religions as 
subversive to the society in which they exist. This description, although 
now and then ridiculed, is remarkably apt-at least when we consider re-
ligion at its best. The reason for religion's subversive power is its tendency 
to focus the attention and, ultimately, the values of adherents on a set of 
understandings often quite different from the understandings of the domi-
nant forces in the culture. A simple example is the continued insistence of 
tens of millions of Americans that the Genesis story of creation is literally 
true and the theory of evolution, to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
29. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 104, 42 
U.S.C. § 604(a) (1998) (authorizing religious and other charitable organizations to provide certain 
forms of public service assistance). 
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Genesis, is false.30 It is religious community, and nothing else, that sustains 
these believers in their certainty. To answer by saying that we would be 
better off if they believed something else is imperialism, not argument, for 
it presupposes a cultural monopoly not only on truth, but also on the range 
of permissible belief about truth. And the same answer could have been 
offered to the abolitionists, who were also sustained by their faith commu-
nities in their certainty that the Biblical injunction to love our neighbors 
meant slavery was impermissible. Abolitionists, creationists, pacifists, 
pro-lifers: what religion at its best supplies to the larger society is a verita-
ble cornucopia of difference. 
The theologian David Tracy, in his masterwork Plurality and 
Ambiguity, has put it this way: "Despite their own sin and ignorance, the 
religions, at their best, always bear extraordinary powers of resistance. 
When not domesticated as sacred canopies for the status quo nor wasted by 
their own self-contradictory grasps at power, the religions live by 
resisting."31 So the culture may press the religions to change; but the relig-
ions, at their best, press back. And they press back in a way that no other 
force does, for the transcendence of religious belief proposes an answer 
higher than mere human striving. The Western religions in their traditional 
forms all share the model of transcendence: The answers to the most pro-
found questions are found not in human argument but in the will of God, 
which exists in the world in written form and sometimes in an oral heritage 
as wel1.32 
When religion presses back against the dominant culture, both are 
changed as a result of the encounter. One reason that the culture changes 
may be that we are constructed in a way that causes our souls to resonate to 
religious language, even when we prefer to avoid it. The spirituality of 
religion, for most Americans, fills a hole in the human soul t:lJ.at the more 
material aspects of our world leave agape. Of the theistic religions this is 
particularly true, but a non-theistic faith, such as the more refined forms of 
Buddhism, can play the same role. We might, of course, take the totalitar-
ian view that we should allow no forces that press us to be other than we 
are, but then we would not be either genuinely democratic or religiously 
free-and, indeed, we would not be American. 
30. In some surveys, this is the avowed view_ of a majority of Americans, but I doubt that, if 
pressed, all members of this majority would seriously try to prevent their children from studying 
evolution. See, for example, the data discussed in Betty McCollister, Creation "Science" vs. Religious 
Attitudes, USA ToDAY, May 1996, (Magazine), at 74; and Mary Mo1vihill, Going All the Way With 
Danvin, IRISH TIMES, Sept 30, 1995, (Supplement), at 8. 
31. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, REUG!ON, HOPE 83 (1987). 
32. Nothing in this argument turns on one's view of who the authentic interpreter of God's word 
happens to be. One can believe that God's will is eternal and unchanging, and believe at the same time 
that fallible human beings often get it wrong, and believe at the same time that God's will, even 
imperfectly understood, remains transcendently authoritative. 
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All of this suggests that if religion is indeed to be free, one of the 
things it must be free to do is to reinforce itself-that is, to strengthen itself 
against the inevitable incursions of state power. If we focus our under-
standing of free exercise on the needs of religion rather than on the needs 
of the state, especially on the need for religion to create meaning in the 
lives of the faithful, we can see at once the necessity of carving out a 
sphere in which religion is immense, not only in its ability to teach or even 
in its authority, but in its scope, its ability to fill a life-all in an effort to 
balance the subduing immensity of the state. 
These spheres are particularly important if we view the subversive 
power of religion as something to be valued rather than controlled. Justice 
William Brennan seemed to have a particularly sensitive understanding of 
this point. The case that makes the point most sharply may be Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, decided in 1987.33 The decision upheld an amendment to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal statute which prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on a number of grounds, including religion. The 
amendment exempts religious groups, in most of their nonprofit activities, 
from the prohibition on religious discrimination. Without this protection, 
the Court explained, the state might be too free to interfere with ''the ability 
of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions."34 This conclusion is quite sensible, and the statute was a good 
idea. If religions are not allowed to engage in what would otherwise be 
illegal religious discrimination, they would, for practical purposes, cease to 
exist. 
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Marshall. This is what he wrote: "For many individuals, religious activity 
derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious 
community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of shared 
beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of 
individuals. "35 
Let us pause for a moment. Brennan is here taking a side-and the 
right side-in the continuing debate over whether religion is an individual 
or group activity. And although he carefully hedges his bets, his sympa-
thies seem to lie with those theologians who contend that it is the very 
groupness of religion that gives it its meaning-that religion is a narrative 
activity, a story a people tells itself and its issue about its relationship to 
God over time. This in tum suggests that a brand new religion, one 
founded yesterday, say, is not a religion at all, but simply a set of ideas 
33. 483 u.s. 327 (1987). 
34. I d. at 335. 
35. I d. at 341. 
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about God, until it stands the tests of time and community; and that the 
phrase "a religion of one" is an oxymoron. 36 
To say that a religion becomes a religion by virtue of its ability to 
extend itself over time-into the future and into the past-is not to suggest 
that any religion is unchanging, for that very passage of time may help the 
people of God to gain a richer understanding of God's will. As Jaroslav 
Pelikan has written, "[T]he demonstrated ability to sustain and eventually 
to accept the development of doctrine is witness to the vitality of a 
tradition.'037 This is self-evidently true even of religions that often seem to 
critical outsiders to be hidebound, such as Orthodox Judaism and Roman 
Catholicism, both of which moved into their most orthodox phases only in 
the late nineteenth century. If Pelikan is right-and I believe he is-then 
the very ability of a religion to accommodate itself to the world is crucial 
to its survival; those that cannot evolve, die. 
Brennan continues: 
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an 
organization's religious mission, and that only those committed to 
that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a 
religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church's ability 
to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of 
religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom 
as welJ.38 
Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't-! think Brennan is right, although 
the last point is not perhaps so obvious as to need no argument. But note 
Brennan's principal suggestion. If the religious community cannot defme 
itself, cannot set the rules for membership, including the rules of behavior, 
then it is not, in any realistic sense, a religious community. This implies 
that protection of religious freedom requires a high degree of deference to 
the definitional process within the community, that each of the religions 
should possess a large sphere within which to undertake the activities of 
worship and following God. And that is what the theory I have been dis-
cussing requires, too; for it is only through the process of defming, creat-
ing, and strengthening itself that the religion gains the power to resist not 
only the competing meanings proposed by the larger society, but also the 
inevitable incursions of the state, which will, more often than is probably 
comfortable, pressure the religion to change. 
RESISTANCE AND EDUCATION 
This understanding of religion helps explain why the battles over the 
education of children are so intense. A religion exists, as we have seen, 
36. The new set of ideas about God may thus be true and yet not be a religion. 
37. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 59 (1984). 
38. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 342. 
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through resisting the meanings pressed on it by the state and projecting its 
narrative of the people's relationship to God into the future. It will be 
impossible to do so if the religious community does not have significant 
control over the upbringing of its children. This is the point the Supreme 
Court understood in its much-maligned decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,39 
which permitted the Old Order Amish to remove their children from school 
after the eighth grade. The Justices noted, correctly, that "[t]he impact of 
the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish 
religion is not only severe, but inescapable"40-that is, that the law hurt the 
religion and there was no way around the law unless the courts carved out 
an exception. 
Critics of the decision have cast it as an abandonment of the "right" of 
the children to more of an education than their parents prefer, but language 
of this kind only obscures what is at stake. On the one side is a religious 
view of the world, on the other, another view-maybe religious, maybe 
not-held by the state. Both the claim that the children are being harmed 
and the compulsory attendance law itself simply represents the state's way 
of looking at the world. To conclude that it is superior to the parents' way 
of looking at the world is an extension of the state-centeredness of relig-
ious freedom. In particular, to lift the individual child from the context of 
the family, the place where the religion's set of meanings are most closely 
inculcated, is a coercive act that is very likely to destroy, in the long run, 
those religions with which the state is unhappy. The state will place few 
obstacles in the path of domesticated religions that seek to project their 
narratives into the future but seem supportive of the state itself; it is only 
religions that are subversive, particularly those that are radically so, that 
are at risk ... if, as many scholars believe, Yoder is wrong. 
The separation of individual child from family is a dangerous staple 
of the contemporary understanding of education. The state requires all 
families (with the exception of families with the resources to make a dif-
ferent choice) to send their children for education for 6 to 7 hours a day, 
180 days a year, for at least 12 years of the child's life. Many parents com-
plain that parts of the content of the public school curriculum interfere with 
their ability to raise their children in their religion-what I would call, 
more formally, the ability of their religious community to project its 
meanings into the future. Elsewhere, I have argued for very strong defer-
ence to the judgment of parents who object to the curriculum,41 but that is 
not to the present point. Rather, I wish to show how our assumptions about 
the role of family and state in raising children not only retain the 
39. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
40. /d. at 218. 
41. See Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194 (1997). 
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state-centeredness that is always poison to religion, but largely (although, 
of course, not entirely) originated in religious, not secular, visions of edu-
cation. 
It is hornbook constitutional law that the religious training of the 
young is a responsibility of the family and must take place outside the 
bounds of the public school day. Where does this understanding come 
from? Not from constitutional law, but-at least in part-from the nation's 
religious history. The history is complicated.42 The shape of the school day 
has been influenced over time both by the contributions of educational the-
ory and by the need of advanced capitalism for a well-trained workforce. 
But it also represents the outcome of a fierce battle in late nineteenth-
century America between nativist Protestants and Roman Catholic immi-
grants. The Catholics, arriving on these shores from a Europe in which 
there were few common schools, saw religious instruction as pervasive, 
something to which youngsters should be exposed all day, every day. The 
Protestants saw religious instruction as something easily confmed to that 
odd invention of America's Protestants, Sunday school.43 The idea that 
children needed any more religion than they could get at home and in 
Sunday school was, to the Protestant mind, simply ridiculous. The 
Protestants won. And that is why the school day is shaped the way it is, 
without formal religious instruction. And that is why we have the principle 
that we do, which nobody discovered until this battle was joined. And that 
is why there are so many Catholic schools. 
In other words, the choice to design the school day, and the school 
week, in the way that it has traditionally been designed in America, was a 
religious choice made for religious reasons. Indeed, the reasons are even 
more religious than I have suggested: The best evidence is that the com-
mon school was designed to make it harder for Catholic parents to raise 
their children as Catholics. Certainly the early nineteenth-century move-
ment to create, as Horace Mann called it, "universal, free, public 
education"44 generated little support until later in the century, after the 
great post-Civil War wave of European immigrants. The movement pre-
vailed not under the banner of equality but under the banner of national-
ism: The children of the 4nffiigrants would be "Americanized," supporters 
42. I refer the reader interested in the historical discussion of religion and public education in this 
section to my book, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED (1998), and to WARREN A. NoRD, RELIGION AND 
AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA (19951 which contain detailed citations 
on this topic. 
43. See NoRD, supra note 42. Other useful treatments of this history include JAY P. DoLAN, THE 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMEs TO THE PRESENT (1985), and 
ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMrNED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-
1920 (1991). 
44. HORACE MANN, THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSAL, FREE, PUBLIC EDUCATION, cited in 
STEPHEN CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND 
LoYALTY 151 n.5 (1998). 
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wrote, which included, very explicitly, an effort to Americanize-meaning, 
Protestantize-their religious beliefs. 
The same religious battle created our strange American tradition bar-
ring state aid to religious schools. When I say that the tradition is strange, 
what I mean is that it is difficult to explain. This tradition is shared by few 
other countries, not even those, like France, that zealously separate church 
and state. Most countries-and all Western European countries-consider 
direct aid to religious schools as part of a portfolio of pro-family policies, 
like generous family leave for all workers and, for those governments that 
can afford it, a regular stipend for parents. All these programs together are 
aimed at supporting families by supporting the choices that families 
make-the choice, for example, whether to stay home with a child, or 
whether to send that child to a religious school. 
In America, we have gone our own way-or perhaps we have lost our 
way. So parents who stay home with their children are penalized in the 
employment market. Parents who send their children to religious schools 
are penalized in the pocketbook. Both American policy failures have the 
effect of channeling parental choices in the direction the state presumably 
wants them to go: Parents should spend less time with children and more 
time in the paid workforce, and, instead of educating their children in the 
close-knit, nurturing environment of the religious school, should send them 
to the bureaucratized, often impersonal, and aggressively secular public 
school. Although these may appear to be liberal values, they are, in prac-
tice, merely the values of capitalism. 
Well, we Americans have always been the wonders of the world, and 
we are what we are. Still, even in the United States, the tradition against 
public aid to religious schools is of relatively recent vintage; it is only, per-
haps, a century old. During the first century of the nation's history, such 
"public" schools as existed were for all practical purposes Protestant paro-
chial schools, supported by local communities. (Whether we should think 
of local communities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
as "the state" raises tremendous risks of anachronism.) The schools of the 
day, supported by local assessments, featured both prayer and formal re-
ligious instruction. 45 
As the common school movement spread, instruction in Protestant 
values, along with school prayer, spread with it. Nobody doubted that gov-
ernment funds could be used to pay for these schools. For all the virtues of 
the movement, the schools it produced often amounted to little more 
than state-supported efforts to preserve Protestantism and kill the 
45. See Nord, supra note 42, at 71-79. Although this evidence has been much picked over, one of 
the most enduring commentaries on the constitutional significanee of these early practices remains 
Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260 
(1968). 
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"un-American" religions before they could take their pernicious hold on 
the immigrant children. Unsurprisingly, Roman Catholic and Jewish immi-
grants quickly denounced the schools. 
Yet the climate of the times was such that nobody bothered to hide 
any of these facts. On the contrary: it is hardly an accident of history that 
the first compulsory education law in the country was adopted in 
Massachusetts during the period when its legislature and state house were 
in the hands of the rabidly anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party. And 
Governor William Seward, during his two decades of running New York, 
fought for state money to pay for separate Catholic and Jewish schools, on 
the interesting ground that immigrants should not be forced to send their 
children to schools where they would encounter prejudice. In New York 
City, the plan was partly adopted, as the municipal government, for a time, 
paid the salaries of teachers at the Catholic schools. 
Supporters of compulsory education laws in the late nineteenth cen-
tury were quite explicit about their goals. From politicians to schoolteach-
ers (including the head of the fledgling National Education Association), 
they argued that it was the task of the schools to wean immigrant children 
from their foreign religions; and, under this banner, compulsory public 
education triumphed. At the same time, the nativists suddenly discov-
ered-invented might be a better word-the principle that prohibits the use 
of state funds to support religious education, a mischievous idea that killed 
federal legislation that would have benefited the Catholic schools, while 
allowing local governments to continue to pay for their Protestant ''public" 
schools.46 
But look at the result. We inherit from this battle the shape of the 
school day, which we take as a given, notwithstanding its ridiculous 
assumption that parents struggling to offer one set of meanings can easily 
compete with the state, which prefers another. Yet it is not obvious that we 
have correctly calculated the number of hours children must attend school, 
and educational theory, although hunting around the margins in search of 
an hour more or an hour less, also begins with the baseline that we 
have: Six hours of classroom instruction a day, or thirty hours a week, is 
always the starting point. 
And there is a deeper problem. The vision of education that we inherit 
is one that was designed to interfere with the ability of parents to raise their 
children in subversive religions-and millions of Americans evidently 
46. The purportedly secular educational theorists of the twentieth century did not improve 
matters very much. John Dewey, for example, argued that formal religious education was bad for 
children, who should not, he wrote, "be inoculated externally" with ideas that parents "happen to have 
found useful for themselves." He added that religious schooling for children was simply a form of 
segregation, as objectionable as any other. His words should not be lifted from their context He wrote 
at a time when the only formal religious schools considered religious were Catholic and Jewish; he 
wanted the immigrant children to attend the Protestant public schools. 
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believe that it works, as evidenced by surveys indicating that as many as 
half of parents of public school children would prefer to send their children 
to religious schools if they could afford it. (The number who would prefer 
private schools is even larger.) Public education, in other words, began, at 
least in part, as an effort to domesticate religions that were seen as un-
American, and, however more noble our rhetoric than the rhetoric of the 
nativists, there is every reason to think that it plays that role even today. 
There are theorists who defend that role. Amy Gutmann, in 
Democratic Education, is quite explicit in urging that the schools be used 
to limit the ability of parents to raise their children in intolerant religious 
beliefs.47 Stephen Macedo calls for a liberalism prepared to do battle, in-
cluding through its schools, with religions that teach "illiberal" ideas. 48 
Suzanna Sherry warns that educational policy must be crafted to limit the 
effect of the bad choices that religious parents will inevitably make for 
their children.49 Quite apart from its totalitarian bent-it envisions America 
as the land of the single true meaning, which the state, distinct from the 
people who make it, alone decides-this literature seems to assume that the 
purpose of the schools is to minimize the aggregate cost of parental error. 
The family, in this vision, becomes a little baby-making factory, whose 
purpose is to create children for the benefit of the state. 
Sadly, this is also the unspoken message of much of the criticism of 
Yoder-including, I would say, Justice Douglas's famous dissent, in which 
he explains why the parents' liberty to choose a religious education for the 
child is not unlimited: "Where the child is mature enough to express 
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights 
to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views."50 The image 
that comes to mind is of a state bureaucracy charged with determining, 
each time a "mature" child is sent to a religious high school, whether the 
child objects; the fact that we might call the bureaucrats judges does noth-
ing to alter, from the point of view of the religiously resisting family, the 
totalitarian implications of the idea itself. 51 
47. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 30-31 (1987). Gutmann insists, without citing 
any evidence, that many religious parents have historically taught their children "disrespect for people 
who are different" Id. at 31. 
48. Stephen Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 PoL. THEORY 280, 285-89 (1990). Macedo 
proposes educating children for what he calls "situated autonomy," a status in which "quiet obedience, 
deference, unquestioned devotion, and humility" become practically impossible. Id. One can easily see 
how many religious families would view such state action as imperialistic-and perhaps downright 
wicked. 
49. See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHt. L. 
REv. 131, 160-61 (1995); see also Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of 
Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REv.1317, 1353 (1994) (arguing that "compulsory education laws reduce the 
risk of totalitarian control or abuse of children") 
50. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
51. One wonders whether Justice Douglas would have had the same solicitude for a child whose 
parents prefer public school but who would rather attend a parochial school-always assuming, for the 
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The case that here comes to mind, of course, is the Sixth Circuit's 
rather controversial 1987 decision in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of 
Education. 52 The case involved religious parents who objected on religious 
grounds to a curriculum aimed at teaching what school officials described 
as "tolerance." (The official title was "critical reading.") The parents be-
lieved that the contents of the critical reading course were actively at odds 
with the teachings of their faith. The court, siding with the school, re-
sponded that learning the tools of tolerance would not be harmful to the 
children and would not force them to reject the parents' beliefs. As Nomi 
Maya Stolzenberg has pointed out, however, the judges actually rejected 
not only the parents' legal claim, but also their religious claim. 53 The panel 
simply did not believe that teaching tolerance could be religiously objec-
tionable. 
The Mozert decision represents what I hope will be the zenith of judi-
cial endorsement of the idea that we are, at heart, unsituated individuals, 
able to create and recreate ourselves constantly according to the new theo-
ries to which we are exposed, as against the view more common among the 
religions that we are, each of us, deeply connected to a community, and 
that the community and its norms are as constitutive of our selves as any-
thing else.54 
Over the years, any number of religious communities have gone so far 
as to try to make themselves geographically distinct, in order to preserve 
precisely the groupness, the communal connection to God, that creates a 
sense of identity and confers meaning on what might otherwise seem a 
hopelessly arbitrary world. The Supreme Court's sympathy for the Old 
Order Amish in Yoder has inspired few other judges to be as bold. On the 
contrary, the courts seem to agree with the assessment of the legal scholar 
Christopher Eisgruber that the Constitution itself somehow prefers assimi-
lation-even when dissenting communities believe that too much contact 
with the larger society will injure their ability to preserve what makes them 
distinct. 55 
Mozert has plenty of academic defenders; I suspect that its academic 
defenders outnumber its academic critics. The strongest form of their 
sake of the example, that the parents have the means to pay. If, as I suspect, the answer would turn out 
to be that the ratchet turns only one way, then the state, through its courts, would be evidencing a quite 
open and obvious anti-religious bias. 
52. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
53. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581 (1993). 
54. The leading academic defenders of this vision of the communal self are Alasdair Macintyre 
and Charles Taylor, even though their understandings of its significance are quite different. Compare 
Al.ASDAIR MAciNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984), with CHARLES 
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989). 
55. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 
87 (1996). 
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argument might be summarized, in formal terms, this way: The family 
holds the potential to exercise enormous power, and power, in the liberal 
understanding, must always have a liberal justification. Arming the chil-
dren with the tools of critical inquiry, then, might be seen as a way of lim-
iting the power the family would otherwise be able to exercise. 56 
But the student of religion as resistance cannot help but be troubled by 
the degree of trust this approach places in the state. By positing a right of 
the children to gain sufficient critical insight to allow them the possibility 
of rejecting the religious community of the parents, Mozert's defenders 
risk undermining the ability of the community to resist state domination. 
Perhaps this state of affairs is inevitable. We have already seen that 
the conflict between religion and state is unavoidable. Once we concede 
the authority of the state to set up its own schools, we already give the state 
an enormous advantage in deciding which meanings to inculcate in chil-
dren, and so we reduce the possibility the dissenting religions will success-
fully project their subversive meanings into the future. We domesticate the 
religions through the simple device of taking their children. 
We can justify this, of course, by following the lead of the icons of the 
public school movement, Horace Mann and John Dewey,.who argued with 
some force that the state needs citizens raised to respect certain democratic 
values if it is to function-in principle, a very good idea. 57 Yet now our 
state-centeredness becomes simple statism, for the argument assumes, on 
the basis of what evidence one can only guess, that the state, as an empiri-
cal matter, will make better judgments than the parents about what the 
children need to know. Or, more formally, it assumes that the aggregate 
costs of the errors the state will make if it is the central source of meanings 
will be smaller than the aggregate costs· of the errors the parents will make 
if the family is the central source of meanings. 
Moreover, the very idea that we can aggregate these costs rests on the 
assumption that our own paradigm will remain undisturbed, that no subse-
quent shift, perhaps led, as so often, by a radically subversive religious 
vision, will undo what we have thought settled moral and even scientific 
knowledge. How do we know that the system established today to promote 
liberal hegemony by wiping out opposing centers of meanings will not be 
captured tomorrow to promote racist or fascist hegemony in an America in 
which opposing centers of meaning are dead? How do we know, in other 
words, that the good guys will always, or even usually, be on top?58 
56. This is the argument of Macedo, supra note 48, and Gutmann, supra note 47, as well as such 
mainstream liberals as William Galston and Bruce Ackerman. 
57. See the discussion in CARTER, supra note 44, at41-49. 
58. As a believer in actual diversity of opinion, I leave it to the reader to decide whether the good 
guys are on top now. 
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Nothing in the history of the state as an entity, or of humanity as a species, 
justifies so extraordinarily optimistic an assumption. 
CLOSING THOUGHTS: RELIGION AS "RIGHT" 
My argument, quite designedly, has no obvious legal consequences, 
except, perhaps, to support the Court's much-ignored 1925 decision in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,59 which held that the state may force parents to 
send their children to school but may not force parents to send their chil-
dren to public schools. Plainly, if the religious schools do part of the work 
of preserving religions over time and thus of nurturing the communities of 
resistance that undomesticated religions can be, it is only the totalitarian 
state, the state of the singular state-given meaning, that will want to sup-
press them. Thus, it shonld be unsurprising that the Oregon ballot initiative 
held unconstitutional in Pierce, a law basically prohibiting the operation of 
private schools, arose from precisely the same anti-Catholic animus that 
generated much of the support for the compulsory education laws them-
selves. 
But it is not my purpose, as I said at the outset, to help decide con-
crete cases, for I am no longer persuaded that a constitutional theory of 
religion will ever be more than a constitutional theory about the needs of 
the state. To talk about religion in terms of the Constitution is already to 
take the first step toward taming the subversive nature of religion at its 
best; we already begin to strip away what David Tracy calls their power of 
resistance. 
So perhaps the religionist's challenge is larger, in this legal order built 
so precariously on a foundation of state-decreed and state-defined rights. 
Perhaps the person of sincere and motivating belief should not conceptu-
alize religion as an activity that needs the protection of constitutional right. 
Perhaps considering the exercise of religion as constitutionally protected is 
itself the source of the difficulty of which I have been speaking. Why? 
Because, inevitably, if only through the act of definition, the government 
becomes partner in the religion-almost always, the stronger partner. How 
stronger? For all the reasons we have seen, when we leave it to government 
(the courts) to decide what is protected and what is not, we create enor-
mous pressure over time for religions to conform to the defmitions that the 
government presses upon them. So the Mormons yield on polygamy and 
the Southern Baptists yield on racism and I suppose we can sit and con-
gratulate ourselves and insist that state pressure has made these faiths mor-
ally better than they were before. But has the pressure helped moved these 
religions to a truer understanding of the will of God? I hope so-but the 
59. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
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future worries me. Because sometimes, when the state presses religions to 
change, congratulations will not be in order.60 
One thinks here of S!iSren Kierkegaard, who warned that Christians 
should never think of themselves as defenders of the faith, because, in so 
doing, they reduce their faith to the status of a thing needing defense. 
Something closely analogous might be said of the worship of God, the ac-
tivity at the heart of most Western religions. Perhaps it is an error for re-
ligionists to conceive of the worship of God as a right because, in so doing, 
they reduce it to a thing that one needs a right in order to do. And that re-
duction is potentially deadly to genuine freedom of religion. 
Religious freedom, under a regime of constitutional rights, is like 
Christina Two: a lovely theory, but not really a theory about religion. 
Religious freedom is, instead, a theory about the needs of the state. The 
hard question for religionists is whether to participate in it or not. One an-
swer is that there is no choice: We are where we are. The other answer is 
that God will provide. 
60. In addition to some of the examples discussed in the text, a striking occurrence of this 
difficulty is found in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 689-703 (1989), holding that 
payments to a church for mandatory services are not deductible as a contribution or gift for religious 
purposes unless the government agrees with the church's definition-possibly an inevitable holding, 
but nevertheless a deeply tragic one. 
